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Abstract 
This paper examines the monitoring role of small audit firms (i.e., those with 100 or fewer 
clients who are subject to different levels of oversight by the PCAOB) on earnings management. 
Specifically, I examine the relationship between earnings manipulations and the use of small 
audit firms. I find that small audit firms are less able to constrain managers’ opportunistic use of 
discretionary accruals. However I find no evidence that small audit firms are associated with real 
activities manipulation. By investigating a specific group of audit firms that are the smallest in 
the audit market, this study extends our understanding of the role of audit firm size in audit 
quality. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
This study investigates why small audit firms are chosen by clients and whether they are 
effective monitors of earnings management. This study is motivated by the recent attention the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has given to small audit firms as well as 
by a growing stream of academic research into the implications of the use of small audit firms 
(e.g. Hermanson, Houston, and Rice 2007; DeFond and Lennox, 2011). Despite a large amount 
of research on the impact of larger audit firms (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993; Palmrose 1988; 
Becker et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999; DeFond 1992; Farber 2005) there is little extant 
research on smaller audit firms. 
The PCAOB was established with the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in response 
to the cascade of audit failures in the preceding decade. PCAOB inspections accompanied by 
other strains on the resources of audit firms (e.g., the shortened 8-K filing deadline, SOX section 
404, etc.) have dramatically changed the audit market.
1
 Small audit firms are particularly 
                                                 
1
 One of the greatest controversies surrounding the establishment of the PCAOB is the shift from self-regulation to 
government regulation in the U.S. audit market. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the PCAOB to inspect 
registered audit firms either annually or triennially, depending upon whether the audit firm provides audit reports for 
more than 100 issuers (annual inspection) or 100 or fewer issuers (triennial inspection). This rule has replaced the 
peer review system promulgated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The debate 
has thus arisen regarding whether the PCAOB inspections are more effective than the pre-SOX AICPA peer review 
system. 
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impacted by resource constraints and the increasing regulation of audit firms has increased their 
compliance costs. Consistent with these increased costs, DeFond and Lennox (2011) find that 
over six hundred small audit firms (i.e., those with 100 or fewer clients) exited the public client 
market after the adoption of SOX in 2002. DeFond and Lennox (2011) document that exiting 
small audit firms are of lower quality when compared with non-exiting small audit firms. 
However, it is an open question whether small audit firms provide lower quality audits than other 
audit firms in general. 
Existing research has focused on differences in the quality of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors.
2
 
It is generally assumed that larger audit firms provide higher quality audits (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; 
Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Francis and 
Krishnan 1999; Francis, Maydew, and Sparks 1999).
3
 However, recent studies such as Boone, 
Khurana, and Raman (2010), do not find significant differences in audit quality between Big 4 
and second-tier audit firms (using abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality).
4
  
                                                 
2
 Throughout the paper, I use the term “Big 4” or “Big N” to refer to the current Big 4 audit firms, and the former 
Big 5, Big 6, or Big 8 audit firms if the period covers previous years when each of these classifications were 
appropriate. 
3
 DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditors may have incentives of providing lower audit quality to retain their clients 
due to future client-specific quasi rents. In this viewpoint, large audit firms provide higher quality because they have 
more to lose from larger client bases. Literature generally views Big 4 auditors as a surrogate for higher audit quality 
based on DeAngelo (1981)’s argument. 
4
 There is evidence that smaller audit firms provide greater value in certain circumstances. Louis (2005) finds that 
acquirers audited by non-Big 4 auditors have significantly higher abnormal returns around M&A announcements 
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It is common in the literature to view non-Big 4 auditors as a homogeneous group, even 
though they exhibit clear differences in various firm attributes, such as size. In this paper, I 
examine the monitoring role of the small audit firms, that is, those with 100 or fewer clients who 
are subject to different levels of oversight by the PCAOB. Specifically, I examine the 
relationship between the small audit firms and earnings manipulation using discretionary 
accruals and real earnings management as earnings manipulation proxies. 
Earlier findings of differences in audit quality are increasingly attributed to the attributes of 
the clients who select the auditors. Lawrence, Minutti-Meza, and Zang (2011) find that the 
differences in proxies for audit quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are more likely 
attributable to client characteristics, especially client size. To control for client characteristics 
and potential endogeneity, I employ a propensity-score matched sample to examine the 
association between earnings management and the use of small audit firms. I estimate the 
propensity score using an auditor choice model that employs variables identified in prior 
literature that may affect the selection of auditors (Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003; 
Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004). I then examine the relationship between earnings 
manipulation measures and an indicator variable for small audit firms. In further analysis, I also 
use another earnings manipulation measure, real earnings manipulations based on 
                                                                                                                                                             
than do acquirers audited by Big 4 audit firms. Louis interprets this finding to mean that smaller audit firms have a 
comparative advantage in local markets when assisting their clients in merger transactions. 
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Roychowdhury (2006), to examine whether the likelihood of hiring small audit firms is 
associated with real earnings manipulations. 
In descriptive analysis, I find that firms with higher asset turnover, a lower current asset 
component of total assets, a higher quick ratio, or lower industry litigation risk are more likely to 
hire smaller audit firms while client size (measured by log of assets) is significantly negatively 
associated with the likelihood of hiring smaller audit firms. I further find that firms using small 
audit firms are more likely to engage in higher levels of earnings manipulation, as measured by 
discretionary accruals (but not by real activities manipulations). The result holds when I use 
different thresholds to define smaller audit firms (e.g., audit firms with fewer than 30 clients or 
50 clients). Finally, when I exclude exiting auditors from my sample, I find that there is still a 
positive association between the use of small audit firms and accrual-based earnings 
management. 
These findings supplement the previous literature on small audit firms. The previous 
literature focuses on Big 4 auditors and treats non-Big 4 auditors as a homogeneous group to 
compare against. Nonetheless, there are differences among non-Big 4 auditors on characteristics 
such as client size, number of audit partners, resources and operations. Additionally, some non-
Big 4 audit firms have national operations while others have only regional or local operations. 
These differences among non-Big 4 audit firms are actually quite sizeable and should be of 
interest to researchers.  Further, although previous studies indicate that small audit firms have 
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more audit deficiencies or quality control defects (Hermanson et al. 2007; Hermanson and 
Houston 2008), there is little evidence of why firms choose small audit firms and the incentives 
behind that choice.  
As mentioned previously, DeFond and Lennox (2011) show small audit firms exiting the 
audit market for publicly listed firms have lower audit quality than non-exiting small audit firms 
(measured by the propensity to issue going-concern opinions). In contrast to DeFond and 
Lennox’s (2011) study, I examine whether earnings management associated with small audit 
firms differs from that associated with non-small audit firms. I focus on earnings management 
through the use of accruals since reported discretionary accruals are the joint product of 
managers and auditors and thus represent an important aspect of financial reporting quality. 
Besides accruals management, managers may conduct earnings manipulation through real 
activities (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Roychowdhury 2006; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 
2008; Gunny 2010). Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) found that firms engage in higher levels of 
real earnings management in the presence of Big 4 auditors because the opportunity for accruals 
management is limited. By also investigating the effect of small audit firms on real earnings 
management, this paper contributes to our knowledge of the role of small audit firms in 
constraining managers’ opportunistic behavior through multiple channels. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews related 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Chapter 3 presents the research design and the data. 
6 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 reports empirical results. Chapter 5 concludes and discusses the limitations of this 
study. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
In this section, I summarize related literature and develop the hypotheses. I first discuss the 
demand for auditing in Section 2.1 and then review the literature on audit firm size and audit 
quality in Section 2.2. Hypotheses are developed in Section 2.3. 
 
2.1 Demand for Auditing 
Wallace (1987) indicates that the demand for auditing services can be explained by agency, 
information, and insurance dimensions. Agency theory suggests that auditing services serve as a 
monitoring mechanism to reduce agency costs that arise from the conflict of interest between 
principals and agents. In addition, agency theory explains that an agent himself has incentives to 
demand a monitoring mechanism to protect his level of wages, because without monitoring, the 
principals may adjust prices when they expect that self-interested agents may not act in the best 
interests of principals. From this perspective, auditing services can be viewed as a type of 
monitoring mechanism and companies demand services to provide evidence that they produce 
reliable financial statements to financial statements users (e.g., investors, creditors, etc.).  
The information hypothesis suggests that audited financial statements help investors with 
their decision making by reducing information risks. Specifically, audited data provides investors 
with a better estimate of risks and expected returns when making their investment portfolio 
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selections. Finally, the insurance hypothesis suggests that investors and creditors view auditors 
as having “deep pockets” and that they will be able to recover potential financial losses in 
bankruptcy from the auditors. Auditors will not only care about potential monetary losses, but 
they will also be concerned with protecting their reputation. This illuminates the reasons auditors 
are look for insurance.  
To date, evidence generally supports the above arguments. For example, Chow (1982) finds 
that agency costs, measured by greater firm size and higher debt leverage, have positive 
association with voluntary demand for auditing. In the private market setting, Abdel-Khalik 
(1993) shows that greater firm size is a significant determinant of voluntary demand for auditing. 
In the initial public offering (IPO) market setting, Balvers et al. (1988) and Beatty (1989) 
document that hiring Big 6 auditors reduces IPO underpricing, which is consistent with the 
information role of auditing.
5
 Menon and Williams (1994) finds that the disclosure of Laventhol 
& Horwath bankruptcy had an adverse effect on the market price of L&H clients, which supports 
that market price incorporates the expected insurance coverage from auditors.  
 
 
                                                 
5
 For auditor choice in the IPO setting, Hogan (1997) finds that the decision is associated not only with the benefits 
of underpricing reduction but also with the costs of auditor compensation that they can afford. 
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2.2 Supply of Audit Quality 
Supply-side research investigates the factors that affect an auditor’s ability to supply better 
quality audits. DeAngelo (1981) defines audit quality as the joint probability of an auditor’s 
ability to discover and report a breach. Reporting a breach requires auditor independence, and 
discovery of the fraud involves characteristics of the auditor’s ability such as expertise, 
experience, and knowledge. Of these factors, a large body of studies takes Big N auditors to be 
high quality auditors. My study focuses on smaller audit firms and revisits the audit firm size 
issue. Therefore, I review the relevant literature regarding the relationship between auditor size 
and audit quality in this section. In addition, I summarize the related literature on the recent trend 
of changes in audit quality with regard to audit firm size. 
 
Audit Firm Size 
It is commonly acknowledged in academic research that Big N auditors are regarded as 
higher quality auditors. DeAngelo (1981) argues that auditors earn client-specific quasi rents and 
they have reputation concerns with respect to their clients. Therefore, auditors with a greater 
number of clients have lower incentives to cheat when a breach is discovered. Large audit firms 
may thus provide better quality audits, because they have “more to lose” compared to small audit 
firms (i.e., they can bear higher potential reputational loss). 
10 
 
 
 
To test this argument, most studies use a Big N and non-Big N dichotomous variable and the 
evidence generally supports that Big N auditors provide superior audit quality. For example, 
Researchers find that Big N auditors are associated with smaller abnormal accruals (e.g., Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999). Big 4 auditors are sued 
less often (Palmrose, 1988), and they provide more informative reports. Geiger and Rama (2006) 
find that Big 4 auditors exhibit higher reporting quality when they issue going-concern audit 
reports (i.e., lower type I and lower type II error rates). Weber & Willenborg (2003) find that 
going-concern audit reports by Big 4 auditors have more predictive power as to their clients’ 
bankruptcy in an IPO setting. Behn, Choi, and Kang (2008) show that clients audited by Big N 
auditors have higher analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and smaller forecast dispersion. In term 
of information asymmetry, the use of Big N auditors provides information and reduces the cost 
of equity or the cost of debt (Khurana and Raman 2004; Fortin and Pittman 2004). Investors also 
perceive audit quality as higher when it is supplied by Big N auditors (Teoh and Wong 1993, 
Krishnan 2003).  
In addition to studies where auditor reputation is represented by the use of Big 4 auditors, 
studies also investigate other auditor characteristics that may affect audit quality by constraining 
managers’ deliberately discretionary behavior such as expertise, tenure, and independence 
(Craswell, Francis, and Taylor 1995; Krishnan 2003; Myers, Myers, and Omer 2003; Lennox 
and Pittman 2008; Gul, Sami, and Zhou 2009; Reichelt and Wang 2010; etc.). 
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Recent Trends and Second-Tier Audit Firms 
Beyond the Big and Non-Big N differentiation, recent studies have turned to examine within 
Big 4 auditor variations. For instance, studies investigate auditor industry expertise, office size, 
and cross-country evidence within Big N auditors. Craswell et al. (1995) find that Big N industry 
experts outperform Big N non-experts. Reichelt and Wang (2010) show that audit quality, as 
measured by abnormal accruals, the likelihood of meeting or beating analyst forecasts, or the 
propensity to issue a going-concern audit opinion, is higher when the auditor is both a national 
and city specific industry specialist. Francis and Yu (2009) find that larger offices of Big 4 
auditors provide higher quality when they use client restatements as the measure of audit quality. 
Using 42 countries as their sample, Francis, Michas, and Seavey (2011) document that 
concentration within the Big 4 group appears to be detrimental to audit quality. 
Another line of research examines the emergence of “second-tier” auditors. After Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was put into effect, Big 4 auditors face higher resource constraints as to their 
engagements, which may reduce their audit quality. As recommended by the PCAOB, Big 4 
auditors are more costly due to the increasing regulatory costs and the use of some larger non-
Big 4 auditors may be a viable alternative to Big 4 auditors in the post-SOX period (Grant 
Thornton LLP. 2006). In fact, more clients have been observed switching from Big 4 auditors to 
smaller audit firms as a result of increased audit fees. 
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In response to this trend, some argue that differences between Big N and non-Big N auditors 
has declined due to a series of accounting scandals in the early 2000s for Big N audit firms. In 
addition, Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic (2008) argue that the audit quality of Big N and non-Big 
N auditors is expected to converge as the legal and regulatory regime becomes more onerous. 
Some recent evidence suggests that second-tier auditors may provide similar quality relative to 
Big N auditors. For example, Boone et al. (2010) find no difference in audit quality between Big 
4 auditors and second-tier auditors during 2003-2006 when they use abnormal accruals as the 
quality measure. Using the ex ante cost of equity capital as the proxy for financial reporting 
credibility, Cassell, Giroux, Myers, and Omer (2011) find that the financial reporting credibility 
of second-tier clients is  indistinguishable from that of Big 4 clients. Jenkins and Velury (2011) 
find no significant difference in accounting conservatism between clients of Big N and second-
tier auditors in either the pre- or post-SOX periods, and they also find a greater discrepancy in 
the variation in conservatism between clients of Big N and other non-Big N smaller auditors 
relative to the variation in conservatism between clients of second-tier auditors and other non-
Big N smaller auditors.  
Nonetheless, Hogan and Martin (2009) find that the frequency of auditor switches from Big 
N auditors to smaller audit firms has increased, which leads to an increased exposure to more 
business risks for second-tier auditors as they accept larger clients coming from Big 4 
predecessor auditors. This may increase the litigation risks for second-tier auditors. 
13 
 
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Earnings management is defined by Healy and Wahlen (1999) as “earnings management 
occurs when management uses judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers.” Among the various monitoring mechanisms that constrain managers’ 
incentives to manipulate reported earnings, the use of external auditors is regarded as one of the 
most effective ways to improve the credibility of financial reporting. As indicated by Dechow, 
Ge, and Schrand (2010), the selection of auditor is a way to control for managers’ accounting 
choices. 
Previous literature indicates that the demand for hiring Big 4 auditors is increasing in agency 
costs (Francis and Wilson 1988, DeFond 1992) consistent with the common perception in 
academic research that large accounting firms provide higher quality audits (e.g., DeAngelo 
1981; Dye 1993; Palmrose 1988; Becker et al. 1998; Francis and Krishnan 1999; DeFond 1992; 
Farber 2005). In a theoretical framework, DeAngelo (1981) illustrates that auditors may 
compromise their independence due to the economic dependence on their clients, mainly the 
relative economic importance of the client to the auditor’s client portfolio. Large audit firms are 
more likely to resist the threat because they have “more to lose” compared with small audit firms 
(i.e., they can bear higher reputation loss), and hence large audit firms may provide better audit 
14 
 
 
 
quality. In addition to reputational concerns, the literature also indicates that large audit firms 
have greater wealth at risk from litigation so the audit quality of large audit firms is higher due to 
their “deeper pockets” (Dye 1993). In archival studies, researchers commonly use a dichotomous 
variable (Big 4/non-Big 4) as a surrogate for audit firm size to test its relation to audit quality. 
For example, Becker et al. (1998) and Francis et al. (1999) document that Big 6 auditors are 
associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. Lennox (1999) finds that the propensity of 
large audit firms to issue a going-concern opinion is higher for a sample of financially distressed 
companies in the UK. Teoh and Wong (1993) show that market values are higher for companies 
with Big 4 auditors (higher audit quality is presumed to be reflected in a higher earnings 
response coefficient). In addition, other studies suggest that large audit firms supply higher 
quality audits as evidenced by the higher audit fees they receive (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987; 
Beatty 1989). 
The audit market has dramatically changed after the demise of Arthur Andersen and the 
adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In response to increased demand, the cost of hiring Big 4 
auditors has increased, which in turn, has led an increasing number of companies to switch to 
smaller audit firms.
6
 This raises the issue of whether smaller audit firms provide similar audit 
                                                 
6
 According an article released on 10/18/2005, second-tier accounting firms such as Crowe Chizek, Grant Thornton, 
BDO Siedman, and RSM McGladrey have picked up 417 ex-Big 4 clients since 2003 (Reference: 
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/101381). This may be caused by resource constraint of the Big 4 in the post-
SOX era. 
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quality to Big 4 auditors. Some studies investigate smaller audit firms (usually second-tier firms) 
and treat all non-Big 4 auditors as a heterogeneous group (Boone et al. 2010; Chang, Cheng, and 
Reichelt 2010; Hogan and Martin 2009). However, the properties of small audit firms are largely 
unknown. DeFond and Lennox (2011) indicate that half of small audit firms exit the market in 
the post-SOX era (possibly driven by the increasing compliance costs imposed on small audit 
firms). In addition, they find that exiting auditors are lower quality auditors when compared to 
the successor auditors. I do not know, however, whether all small audit firms provide lower 
quality audits.  
It is unclear why firms choose smaller audit firms. Compared with Big 4 audit firms, small 
audit firms charge lower audit fees and (hopefully) provide cost-effective audits to their clients. 
Hogan (1997) demonstrates that some initial public offering firms may select non-Big 4 auditors 
because of cost and benefit considerations. Another conjecture is that if small audit firms do not 
have sufficient ability to detect earnings management, firms with incentives to manipulate 
reported earnings may choose small audit firms. There is also some controversy in the previous 
literature on smaller audit firms’ quality in various settings. Some claim that small audit firms 
have better knowledge of local markets and have close connections with their local business 
communities. For example, Louis (2005) reports that clients of non-Big 4 audit firms have higher 
abnormal returns around M&A announcements, which implies that smaller audit firms provide 
higher quality audits for firms involved in M&A events. In contrast, there is also evidence 
showing that small audit firms (those with fewer than 100 public clients and are triennially 
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inspected by PCAOB) are more likely to have audit deficiencies and quality defects (Hermanson 
et al. 2007; Hermanson and Houston 2008). I thus examine whether firms using small audit firms 
engage in a higher level of earnings manipulation, as measured by discretionary accruals or real 
earnings manipulations. Specifically, I examine the following hypothesis (stated in the null form): 
HYPOTHESIS 1. Firms using the small audit firms do not engage in a higher level of earnings 
manipulation, measured by discretionary accruals or real earnings management. 
 
If hypothesis 1 is supported, we may observe a change in earnings management when clients 
of small audit firms switch to larger audit firms. I therefore investigate whether switches to larger 
auditors decrease the level of earnings management.
7
 If larger audit firms have higher ability to 
constrain earnings management than small auditors do, we expect to observe a decrease in 
earnings manipulation when clients of the small audit firms switch their auditors to larger 
auditors. If large and small auditors do not provide different levels of monitoring for the purpose 
of detecting earnings management, we would not expect to find any changes in earnings 
manipulations. Specifically, I test the hypothesis below (described in the null form): 
                                                 
7
 With regard to downward switches, some studies identified the reasons and client characteristics. Blouin, Grein, 
and Rountree (2007) find that agency costs and switching costs can explain the choice of switches for former Arthur 
Andersen clients. Landsman, Nelson, and Rountree (2009) investigate auditor switches to and from the Big N 
auditors and find that client misalignment and risk are determinants for downward switches.  
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HYPOTHESIS 2. Firms switching from the small audit firms to larger audit firms do not 
subsequently engage in a lower level of earnings manipulation, as measured by discretionary 
accruals or real earnings management. 
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Chapter 3 Research Design and Data 
 
I discuss my research design in section 3.1. Prior research on the relationship between audit 
quality and the choice of audit firms suffers from self-selection bias because the choice of audit 
firms may be endogenous. In other words, auditors are not randomly assigned to the companies. 
The characteristics of companies may affect their choices of auditors, but audit quality does not 
determine auditor choices. To avoid this issue, prior studies use Heckman (1979) two stage 
methodology to mitigate the self-selection bias (Hogan 1997; Weber and Willenborg 2003; 
Chaney, Jeter, and Shivakumar 2004; Khurana and Raman 2004; Mansi, Maxwell, and Miller 
2004; Louis 2005; Fortin and Pittman 2007; Choi, Kim, Liu, and Simunic 2008; Li 2009).  
However, large and small audit firms have quite different clienteles at the extremes of the 
distribution (the smallest clients tend to have non-Big 4 while the largest clients use the Big 4). 
As discussed in Lennox, Francis, and Wang (2012), self-selection bias will not be solved using 
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure if the exclusion restrictions are not satisfied; that is, the 
independent variables from the first stage choice model should be validly excluded from the 
second stage regression. To avoid this issue, I use a propensity score matching procedure to 
identify a treatment and control sample. I describe how to estimate propensity scores in section 
3.1. I then describe my sample selection procedures and descriptive statistics for my sample in 
section 3.2. 
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3.1 Research Design 
To estimate propensity scores and identify a matched sample for the small audit firms, I use 
the following logit model to estimate the probability of selecting a small audit firm: 
SMALLt = β0 + β1 SIZEt + β2 LEVt + β3 ROAt + β4 ATURNt + β5 CURRt + β6 QUICKt 
+ β7 RISKINDt + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect + ut,                (1) 
where  
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
SIZEt = logarithm of total assets; 
LEVt = total debt divided by total assets; 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by the beginning-of-year assets; 
ATURNt = asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by total assets; 
CURRt = current assets divided by total assets; 
QUICKt = current assets minus inventory divided by current liabilities; 
RISKINDt = a dummy variable equal to one if the firm operates within a high-litigation 
industry and zero otherwise, where high-litigation industries are industries with 
SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374. 
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The reasoning behind choosing these variables for the model follows. Based on prior 
literature (Francis 1984, Chaney et al. 2004, Lawrence et al. 2011), I posit that audit client size 
affects the choice of the audit firm. Auditors exert more effort on larger firms and thus I include 
the logarithm of total assets and asset turnover to control for audit client size. I include ROA to 
measure profitability since profit-making firms and loss-making firms may have different levels 
of demand for small audit firms. To measure audit risk, I use the quick ratio and leverage to 
represent the short-term and long-term financial structure of the client. I also include the ratio of 
current assets to total assets because accounts receivable and inventory are viewed as high-risk 
assets and require more audit effort and more extensive audit procedures. To measure audit risk 
among different industries, I include a dummy variable that equals one when the industry is 
regarded as a high-risk industry (industries with SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–
3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374) based on previous research (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Gul et al. 
2009). I also include year and industry fixed effects, where industries are identified using the 
Fama and French 48 industries classification.  
I use accrual-based earnings management to proxy for managers’ opportunistic behavior. 
Abnormal accruals are estimated as the residuals from the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) 
model described below: 
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 α
  
      
       
    ,                         (2) 
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where TACt is total accruals, calculated as net income less cash flows from operations, ΔSALESt 
is the change in sales between year t and year t-1, ΔARt is the change in accounts receivable 
between year t and year t-1, PPEt is the gross amount of property, plant and equipment at the end 
of year t, and TAt-1 is total assets at the end of year t-1. I estimate equation (2) in the cross section 
in each year for each industry classification with at least fifteen observations. The residuals from 
equation (2) are the measures of abnormal accruals (DAt). I also compute the performance-
adjusted discretionary accrual (PDAt) similar to Cahan and Zhang (2006). I assign firms in each 
industry into deciles based on the prior year return on assets (ROA) and then obtain the 
performance-adjusted discretionary accrual by taking the DAt for firm i from equation (2) and 
then subtracting the median unadjusted DAt for the corresponding industry ROA decile. 
I then examine the effect of small audit firms on earnings manipulation using accruals 
management as a proxy for managers’ opportunistic behavior, as follows: 
DAt (PDA t) = γ0 + γ1 SMALLt + γ2 MVEt-1 + γ3 ROAt + γ4 MTBt-1  
+ Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect + vt                        (3) 
where  
DA = Modified Jones model discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2), 
measured in absolute values (ABSDA), positive values (PosDA), and negative 
values (NegDA); 
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PDA = Modified Jones model discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2) and 
adjusted for prior year performance, measured in absolute values (ABSPDA), 
positive values (PosPDA), and negative values (NegPDA); 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
ROAt = return on assets;  
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t-1; and 
vt = the error term. 
 
The coefficient of interest is γ1. I expect γ1 to be significantly negative if small audit firms do 
not have the ability to constrain managers’ opportunistic behavior either because they do not 
have sufficient expertise or because they have compromised their independence. Following 
Roychowdury (2006) and Cohen et al. (2008), I use the market-to-book ratio (MTBt-1) and the 
market value of equity (MVEt-1) to control for size and growth opportunities. Further, I include 
ROA to control for the effect of performance. Finally, I winsorize all of the variables at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles of their respective distributions in order to mitigate the effect of potential 
outliers.   
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3.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics 
To identify a sample of small audit firms, I choose audit firms with fewer than 100 public 
clients for the following reasons. First, the frequency of Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) inspections differs for audit firms with more than 100 clients (annual 
inspections) and audit firms with fewer than 100 clients (triennial inspections). Second, studies 
investigating small audit firms use this criterion to select their sample (e.g. Hermanson et al. 
2007; DeFond and Lennox 2011). Thus, to make the results comparable with previous literature, 
I use the same criterion to select the sample.  
Auditor information is obtained from the Audit Analytics Database and financial information 
is collected from CRSP and the Compustat annual industry and research files. In the sample 
period from 2001 to 2009, I obtain 41,305 observations from Audit Analytics. I exclude Arthur 
Andersen clients in 2002 to avoid any potential confounding effects from the Enron event. I then 
exclude firms in the financial industry (SIC codes 6000–6999) and regulated industries (SIC 
codes 4400-5000). I also require at least 15 observations in each two-digit SIC grouping per year 
to estimate the various earnings management proxies. I further delete observations without 
available data to calculate various earnings management measures. This yields 26,428 firm-year 
observations, of which 4,267 observations (16.15%) are clients of small audit firms.  
I then calculate propensity scores using equation (1) based on these observations. Similar to 
Lawrence et al. (2011), I impose a caliper distance of 3 percent on equation (1) to calculate the 
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propensity scores and obtain a propensity score matched sample of 3,048 firm-year observations, 
of which 1,524 are clients of small audit firms and 1,524 are clients of larger audit firms. I 
further exclude observations missing data for the additional control variables (e.g., SIZE, LEV, 
ROA, ATURN, CURR, and QUICK) used in equation (3) and obtain 2,917 observations in the 
final sample.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the propensity matched sample. I match small 
audit firms with other auditors based on client size, asset turnover, leverage, current ratio, quick 
ratio, ROA, and high-litigation industry because prior studies document that those factors are 
associated with the selection of Big 4 auditors (Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Chaney et al. 2004). The 
mean log of total assets (SIZE) is 4.062 for the full sample. Assets turnover (ATURN) is an 
average of 1.271 times per year and leverage (LEV) has a mean value of 0.214. Current assets 
represent 59.9 percent of total assets (CURR) and the average quick ratio (QUICK) is 2.645. The 
average return on assets (ROA) is −22 percent and 41.9 percent of the firms in the sample are in 
high-litigation risk industries (RISKIND). I further present each of these variables for the small 
auditors and for the control group. The tests on the differences in means for the various variables 
show that there is no significant difference in firm characteristics (used in the selection model) 
between clients of the small audit firms and larger audit firms in the propensity-score matched 
sample. However, I find that small audit firms have significantly larger absolute value of 
abnormal accruals (ABSDA or ABSPDA) than other audit firms do in the matched sample. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics: Propensity-score Matched Samples 
 
All Obs. 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
(n=2,917) 
Small Audit firms 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
(n=1,466) 
Other Audit firms 
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
(n=1,451) 
Difference in 
Means 
(t-statistic) 
ABSDAt 0.144 0.158 0.129 0.029
*** 
 (0.185) (0.203) (0.164) (4.239) 
ABSPDAt 0.137 0.150 0.125 0.025
*** 
 (0.201) (0.223) (0.175) (3.405) 
SIZEt 4.062 4.055 4.069 −0.014 
 (1.302) (1.249) (1.354) (−0.287) 
ATURNt 1.271 1.267 1.275 −0.008 
 (1.016) (1.037) (0.995) (−0.218) 
LEVt 0.214 0.223 0.205 0.018 
 (0.338) (0.308) (0.366) (1.437) 
CURRt 0.599 0.600 0.599 0.001 
 (0.246) (0.249) (0.243) (0.116) 
QUICKt 2.645 2.668 2.622 0.046 
 (3.085) (3.193) (2.973) (0.401) 
ROAt -0.220 -0.274 -0.164 0.110 
 (2.677) (3.715) (0.678) (1.107) 
RISKINDt 0.419 0.431 0.407 0.024 
 (0.493) (0.495) (0.491) (1.340) 
MVEt-1 1.572 1.214 1.934 −0.720 
 (3.377) (1.941) (4.344) (−5.787)
*** 
ROAt -0.220 -0.274 -0.164 −0.110 
 (2.677) (3.715) (0.678) (−1.107) 
MTBt-1 2.732 2.621 2.843 −0.221 
 (5.959) (6.182) (5.725) (−1.003) 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-sided), 
respectively. 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year 
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performance; 
SIZEt = logarithm of total assets; 
ATURNt = asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by total sales; 
LEVt = total debt divided by total assets; 
CURRt = current assets divided by total assets; 
QUICKt = current assets minus inventory divided by current liabilities; 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; 
RISKINDt = a dummy variable equal to one if the firm operates within a high-litigation 
industry and 0 otherwise, where high-litigation industries are industries with 
SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374. 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year t;  
 
I report the correlation between all variables in Table 2 (values at the 1 percent significance 
level are in bold). Big4 is negatively correlated with ABSDA, which suggests large accounting 
firms have higher ability to constrain managers’ opportunistic behavior. In contrast, the 
univariate results show that the small audit firms indicator, SMALL, is positively correlated with 
ABSDA (ABSPDA). This suggests that firms hiring small audit firms are more likely to engage in 
accrual-based earnings management. The correlation between Big4 and SMALL is less than one 
since not all non-Big 4 auditors are small. ABSDA is also significantly positively correlated with 
leverage (LEV), and the high-litigation industry dummy variable (RISKIND). ABSDA is 
significantly negatively correlated with firm size (SIZE), ROA, the quick ratio, and the market 
value of equity (MVE). The correlation between ABSDA and the ratio of current assets to total 
assets (CURR) and the market-to-book ratio (MTB) is positive, but is not significant. Finally, 
SMALL is negatively correlated with the market value of equity at the beginning of the year. The 
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rest of the correlations are insignificantly correlated with SMALL (with the exception of ABSDA, 
which was mentioned above). 
Table 3 reports the result from the audit choice model described in equation (1). As expected, 
the coefficient on SIZE is significantly negative (−0.649, P-value < 1%), which suggests that 
smaller companies tend to choose small audit firms. In addition, I find that firms with higher 
asset turnover, lower current ratios, or higher quick ratios are more likely to hire the small audit 
firms. However, leverage (LEV) and firm performance (ROA) are not significantly correlated 
with the probability of hiring small audit firms. Finally, the probability of choosing a small audit 
firm is significantly lower for firms in riskier industries. 
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Matrix 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. ABSDAt 1            
2. ABSPDAt 0.904 1           
3. SMALLt 0.078 0.063 1          
4. Big4t −0.087 −0.069 −0.744 1         
5. SIZEt −0.250 −0.242 −0.005 0.086 1        
6. ATURNt 0.036 0.032 −0.004 −0.041 0.026 1       
7. LEVt 0.215 0.183 0.027 −0.071 −0.128 −0.002 1      
8. CURRt 0.027 0.034 0.002 0.007 −0.291 0.145 −0.215 1     
9. QUICKt −0.095 −0.070 0.007 0.028 0.002 −0.290 −0.292 0.354 1    
10. ROAt −0.256 −0.277 −0.021 0.016 0.097 0.033 −0.045 −0.005 0.022 1   
11. RISKINDt 0.081 0.096 0.025 −0.023 −0.210 −0.130 −0.045 0.185 0.125 −0.064 1  
12. MVEt-1 −0.090 −0.092 −0.107 0.155 0.491 −0.059 −0.064 −0.103 0.055 0.029 −0.054 1 
13. MTBt-1 −0.020 −0.020 −0.019 0.001 −0.017 −0.038 −0.114 0.058 0.113 0.019 0.025 0.125 
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The statistics reported in this Table are based on Pearson correlations. Values displayed in bold 
are significant at the 0.01 significance level. All variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th 
percentiles of their distributions. Variable definitions are in Table 1. 
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TABLE 3 
Auditor Choice of Small Audit Firms  
 SMALLt    
Intercept 2.503***    
 (22.08)    
SIZEt −0.649
***    
 (−64.71)    
ATURNt  0.120
***    
 (8.32)    
LEVt  −0.035    
 (−0.98)    
CURRt  −0.951
***    
 (−13.40)    
QUICKt  0.011
**    
 (2.06)    
ROAt −0.001    
 (−0.22)    
RISKINDt −0.204
***    
 (−4.63)    
Year Dummies Included    
Industry Dummies Included    
N 26,428    
Pseudo R
2 0.420    
The table presents the results of a probit regression of the determinants of small auditor choice 
based on the pooled sample from 2001−2009. SIZE, ATURN, LEV, CURR, QUICK, and ROA are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of their distributions to mitigate the 
influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively.  The z-values are shown in parentheses. 
Variable definitions: 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients and 
zero otherwise; 
SIZEt = logarithm of total assets; 
ATURNt = asset turnover, calculated as sales divided by total sales; 
LEVt = total debt divided by total assets; 
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CURRt = current assets divided by total assets; 
QUICKt = current assets minus inventory divided by current liabilities; 
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
RISKINDt = a dummy variable equal to one if the firm operates within a high-litigation 
industry and 0 otherwise, where high-litigation industries are industries with 
SIC codes of 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, 7370–7374. 
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Chapter 4 Empirical Results 
 
I report the empirical findings in this Charter. Section 4.1 reports the result of tests of the first 
hypothesis. Section 4.2 describes the result of tests of the second hypothesis. I further report 
some robustness check regarding auditor competition, the definition of small audit firms, exiting 
auditors, the use of different audit quality measure, different matching procedures, and economic 
dependence in section 4.3 – 4.8. 
 
4.1 Earnings Management and Small Audit Firms 
 
For the first hypothesis, I use discretionary accruals and real earnings manipulations as the 
proxies for earnings management. 
 
Discretionary Accruals 
Table 4 reports the result of tests using the propensity-score matched sample. In the 
univariate result, the coefficient on SMALL is significantly positive (P-value < 1%) when the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals is the dependent variable, which suggests that firms 
hiring small audit firms engage in a higher level of accruals management. When I partition the 
sample into positive and negative discretionary accruals separately, the coefficient on SMALL is 
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TABLE 4  
The Association between Small Audit Firms and Discretionary Accruals: Propensity-score Matched Sample  
 ABSDAt Pos_DAt Neg_DAt ABSDAt PosDAt NegDAt ABSPDAt PosPDAt NegPDAt 
Intercept 0.073
***
 0.087
***
 −0.054
**
 0.080
***
 0.091
***
 −0.073
***
 0.085
***
 0.116
***
 −0.056
***
 
 (4.96) (3.63) (−2.43) (6.24) (3.79) (−3.71) (7.27) (3.50) (−3.18) 
SMALLt 0.028
***
 0.025
***
 −0.034
***
 0.023
***
 0.020
**
 −0.023
***
 0.019
***
 0.014
*
 −0.023
***
 
 (7.38) (3.32) (−4.73) (5.61) (2.20) (−3.78) (3.54) (1.75) (−3.36) 
MVEt-1    −0.004
***
 −0.003
***
 0.009
***
 −0.005
***
 −0.007
***
 0.005
**
 
    (−3.02) (−2.70) (5.74) (−2.81) (−4.89) (2.18) 
ROAt     −0.017
*
 0.053 0.017
*
 −0.020
**
 0.035 0.020
**
 
    (−1.89) (0.97) (1.82) (−2.15) (0.62) (2.03) 
MTBt-1     −0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
    (−0.39) (0.10) (0.48) (−0.48) (−0.33) (−0.18) 
Year fixed 
effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry 
fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2,917 1,503 1,414 2,917 1,503 1,414 2,917 1,484 1,433 
Adj. R
2
 0.047 0.048 0.069 0.114 0.075 0.157 0.118 0.055 0.167 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of their distributions to 
mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
PosDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
NegDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
PosPDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
NegPDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients and 
zero otherwise; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year t;  
 
still significant for either the positive accruals or the negative accruals. In the multivariate 
analysis, the result is qualitatively the same. The coefficient on SMALL is significantly positive 
(P-value < 1%) when the absolute value of modified Jones model discretionary accruals or 
performance-matched discretionary accruals is the dependent variable. The coefficient on 
SMALL is still significant on positive or negative accruals when I partition the sample into 
positive vs. negative accruals, either for modified Jones model discretionary accruals or for 
performance-matched discretionary accruals.  Overall, the results suggest that small audit firms 
are less likely to constrain managers’ ability to engage in accruals management. 
For the control variables, I find that the coefficient on MVEt-1 is significantly negative when 
the dependent variable is the absolute value of modified Jones model abnormal accruals 
(performance-adjusted abnormal accruals). When the results are broken down for positive and 
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negative discretionary accruals, I find that the coefficient on MVEt-1 is significantly negatively 
(positively) associated with positive (negative) discretionary accruals. All of these results are 
consistent with firms having lower levels of discretionary accruals as firm size increases 
(consistent with prior research, e.g., Cohen et al. 2008). I also find that ROAt is significantly and 
negatively associated with the absolute value of abnormal accruals (either ABSDAt or ABSPDAt). 
This result appears to be driven by significantly positive coefficients on ROAt when the 
dependent variable is negative abnormal accruals (either ABSDAt or ABSPDAt). Finally, the 
market-to-book ratio is not significant in the results.
8
 
 
Real Earnings Manipulations  
Managers may take real economic actions to affect reported earnings if the sacrifices are not 
too large (Bruns and Merchant 1990; Graham et al. 2005). Such real earnings management, 
however, is potentially more costly to shareholders in the long run. Roychowdhury (2006) 
indicates that managers cannot rely on accrual management alone if the gap between the actual 
unmanaged earnings and targeted reported earnings is too large. In addition, the manipulation of 
accruals is more likely to draw scrutiny by auditors and regulators than real actions such as 
                                                 
8
 In a sensitivity analysis, I include cash flows from operation as a control variable because cash flows are 
negatively associated with accruals. I find that the results are qualitatively the same except for the negative accruals. 
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changes in pricing and production. Therefore, managers may conduct earnings management in 
the form of real activities manipulation in order to lower the probability of being detected. 
Consistent with this view, Zang (2012) documents managers engage in real activities 
manipulation before accrual-based earnings management, and that these two types of earnings 
management are substitutes.  
Firms may also switch from accrual-based earnings management to real earnings 
management when opportunities to manage accruals are constrained. Ewert and Wagenhofer 
(2005) analytically demonstrate that the level of real earnings management increases with 
tightening accounting standards. Cohen et al. (2008) present evidence that managers switch from 
accrual management to real earnings management after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
suggesting that managers tend to engage in real earnings management when the legal 
environment becomes increasingly strict. Chi et al. (2011) document that firms resort to higher 
levels of real earnings management when they have strong incentives to manage earnings in the 
presence of higher quality auditors, where audit quality is measured by city level auditor industry 
expertise or the use of Big 4 auditors.  
In this section, I analyze whether the level of real earnings management is associated with the 
use of small audit firms. Following prior literature on real earnings management (Roychowdhury 
2006, Cohen et al. 2008, Gunny 2010), I compute three types of real earnings management: sales 
manipulation, overproduction, and a reduction of discretionary expenditures. Sales manipulation 
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refers to managers’ attempts to increase sales volumes temporarily by offering increased price 
discounts or more lenient credit terms. This type of manipulation can boost current period 
earnings, but it produces lower current period cash flows. Overproduction occurs when managers 
produce more goods than necessary in order to meet expected demand. Producing more units 
decreases fixed overhead costs per unit, and hence reduces the cost of goods sold as long as the 
marginal cost per unit does not exceed the reduction in fixed costs per unit. Therefore, this type 
of manipulation leads to higher operating margins. Finally, the reduction of discretionary 
expenditures includes advertising, R&D, and SG&A expenses. This type of manipulation can 
boost earnings in the current period. 
Based on Roychowdhury (2006), I use the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations 
(CFO), production costs, and discretionary expenses as proxies for real earnings management. 
To estimate abnormal levels of CFO, production costs, and discretionary expenses, I first 
estimate their normal levels using the model developed by Dechow et al. (1998), as implemented 
by Roychowdhury (2006). Specifically, I run the following three regressions for each industry 
and year:
9
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9
 Industry-years with fewer than 15 observations are eliminated from the sample. All variables are winsorized at the 
top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of their respective distributions before the estimation to mitigate the influence 
of outlying observations. 
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where CFO is cash flows from operating activities, PROD is sum of the cost of goods sold and 
the change in inventory in year t, and DISX is the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses, 
and SG&A expenses. Then I calculate the abnormal level of CFO (ABN_CFO) as the residuals 
from regression (4), the abnormal level of production costs (ABN_PROD) as the residuals from 
regression (5), and the abnormal level of discretionary expenses (ABN_DISX) as the residuals 
from regression (6). I then create a comprehensive measure of real earnings management by 
combining the three individual measures based on Cohen et al. (2008)’s methodology. 
Specifically, I compute RM as the sum of the three standardized individual components, that is, – 
standardized ABN_CFO + standardized ABN_PROD – standardized ABN_DISX. Higher levels of 
RM indicate higher levels of overall real earnings management.   
Table 5 presents the results of the effect of small audit firms on real earnings management. 
The coefficients on SMALL are insignificantly different from zero for the matched sample both 
with and without additional controls in the model, which suggests that firms hiring small audit 
firms do not engage in a higher level of real earnings management. Taken together, these 
findings suggest  either that real earnings management is not related to the use of small audit  
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TABLE 5  
The Association between the Small Audit Firms and Real Earnings Management  
 RMt RMt 
Intercept −0.167 −0.094 
 (−1.00) (−0.53) 
SMALLt 0.170 0.138 
 (1.35) (1.05) 
MVEt-1  −0.006 
  (−0.51) 
ROAt   −0.311
***
 
  (−2.70) 
MTBt-1   −0.015
*
 
  (−1.71) 
Year fixed effect Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included 
N 2,168 2,083 
Adj. R
2
 0.084 0.109 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
Variable Definitions: 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
REM = real earnings management measures based on Roychowdury (2006) and 
Cohen et al. (2008), which includes ABN_CFO, ABN_PROD, ABN_DISX, 
and RM defined below; 
ABN_CFOt = abnormal cash flows (negative measure of real earnings management); 
ABN_PRODt = abnormal inventory over-production (positive measure of real earnings 
management); 
ABN_DISXt = abnormal discretionary expenses (negative measure of real earnings 
management); 
RMt = – standardized ABN_CFO + standardized ABN_PROD – standardized 
ABN_DISX  (positive composite score of real earnings management). 
40 
 
 
 
Standardized measure for each variable = [variable – mean(variable)] / 
standard deviation(variable); 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year t. 
 
 
firms or that the clients of small audit firms prefer to engage in accrual-based accruals 
management (which is presumably less costly). 
The main finding in this section is that the use of small audit firms is significantly associated 
with accruals management but not real earnings management. One explanation is that managers 
tend to do more accruals management, compared with real earnings management, when they are 
not restricted from doing so because accruals management and real earnings management can be 
substitutes. Previous studies suggest that the presence of more stringent litigation and regulatory 
regime may drive firms to real earnings management (Cohen et al. 2008; Zang 2012; Chi et al. 
2012). Therefore, when managers have more room to engage in accruals management, there is 
no need for them to engage in other types of earnings management such as real earnings 
manipulations. The other explanation is that auditors have limited impact on opportunistic real 
earnings manipulations behavior because these manipulations usually involve operational 
adjustments based on optimal business decisions, and firms are not violating existing GAAP 
when they use real earnings manipulations. Therefore, it is difficult for auditors to identify real 
earnings manipulations. 
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4.2 Auditor Switches 
To test H2, I select a sample of firms switching from small audit firms to larger audit firms. 
Since there are not many firm-year observations, I report the univariate results in Table 6.  
For firms that switch from small auditors to larger auditors (Big 4 auditors or other non-Big 4 
auditors), I examine the effect on the mean change in the absolute value of abnormal accruals, 
the mean change in the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals, and the 
mean change in real earnings management. The results are reported in Table 6. Since there are 
few instances where firms in my sample switch up from the small audit firms, I report the results 
for tests using only 56 observations in Table 6, which means that the tests reported in Table 6 
lack power. Even with the small number of observations, I find that the mean difference for 
ABSDAt is significantly negative (−0.040, P-value = 0.0342) when firms switch from the small 
auditors to larger auditors using a one-sided test. In addition, the mean difference for ABSPDAt is 
negative (−0.032, P-value = 0.1188) and the mean difference for RMt is also negative (−0.373, P-
value = 0.0547). Although the mean differences for ABSPDAt and RMt are not significant at 
conventional levels, they are near the cut-offs for significance.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 suggest that switches from the small audit firms to 
larger audit firms are associated with reductions in earnings management (although these tests 
lack power due to the small number of upward switches). These results are consistent with larger 
auditors having a stronger monitoring effect on earnings management, and thus, the switch  
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TABLE 6 
Mean Differences for Firms Switching Auditors from Small to Larger Auditors 
Change in mean values from −1 to +1 (t-value) Switches up (n=56) 
ABSDAt 
−0.040
*
  
(−1.86) 
ABSPDAt 
−0.032  
(−1.19) 
RMt 
−0.373  
(−1.63) 
t-statistics for the differences in means are from one-tailed t-tests of the null hypothesis that 
the mean difference equals zero. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels (one-sided), respectively. 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year 
performance; 
REMt = real earnings management measures based on Roychowdury (2006) and 
Cohen et al. (2008), which includes ABN_CFO, ABN_PROD, ABN_DISX, 
and RM defined below; 
ABN_CFOt = abnormal cash flows (negative measure of real earnings management); 
ABN_PRODt = abnormal inventory over-production (positive measure of real earnings 
management);  
ABN_DISXt = abnormal discretionary expenses (negative measure of real earnings 
management); and 
RMt = – standardized ABN_CFO + standardized ABN_PROD – standardized 
ABN_DISX  (positive composite score of real earnings management). 
Standardized measure for each variable = [variable – mean(variable)] / 
standard deviation(variable). 
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causing a decrease in accrual-based and real earnings management. The strongest impact of 
moving up to a larger auditor appears to be when earnings management is accomplished through 
discretionary accruals, but I do find evidence of reduction in real earnings management as well 
(although it is weaker). 
 
4.3 Auditor Competition 
Auditor competition in different industries across small audit firms may affect their ability to 
constrain managers’ earnings management behavior. Therefore, I examine whether the finding of 
worse quality supplied by small audit firms is driven by auditor competition in this section.  
 
Auditor Competition among Industries 
To measure auditor competition in different industries, I calculate a Herfindahl index as the 
sum of the squares of the ratios of each audit firm’s size to the total size of the audit market for 
each industry-year, where industries are defined by 2-digit SIC codes. In other words, the 
Herfindahl index H = ∑    
 
      
 , where N is the total number of audit firms in the industry, si 
is the size of audit firm i, and S is the total size of the audit market in the industry. The size of 
each audit firm is defined as the total audit fees earned from audit clients listed in the Audit 
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Analytics database. If there are four audit firms in the audit market with equal market shares in 
one industry-year, the Herfindahl index will have a value of 0.25. If there is only one audit firm 
in the industry-year, the Herfindahl index will have a value of one. The value of the Herfindahl 
index falls between zero and one, where a value of zero indicates a completely competitive 
market and a value of one represents an oligopoly market. The audit market is more competitive 
when the value of the Herfindahl index is lower. 
I then split the propensity score matched sample by the median of the Herfindahl indexes for 
each industry-year in my propensity-score matched sample and report the result in Table 7. 
Column (1) of Table 7 shows the relationship between discretionary accruals (ABSDA or 
ABSPDA) and the use of small audit firms for firm-year observations below median Herfindahl 
indexes. The coefficient on SMALL is significantly positive when the dependent variable is either 
ABSDA or ABSPDA, which means that a higher level of earnings management is positively 
associated with the use of small audit firms in more competitive industries. Column (2) of Table 
7 presents the result for firm-year observations above median Herfindahl indexes. The 
coefficient on SMALL is still significantly positive when the dependent variable is either ABSDA 
or ABSPDA, which suggests that the positive association between accruals earnings management 
and the use of small audit firms still exists in less competitive industries. Taken together, firms 
using small audit firms have higher level of accruals management, no matter how competitive 
the industries they are in.  
45 
 
 
 
TABLE 7  
Industry Competition and the Association between Small Audit firms and 
Discretionary Accruals  
Herfindahl index Below median  Above median  
 ABSDAt ABSPDAt ABSDAt ABSPDAt 
Intercept 0.085
***
 0.090
***
 0.075
***
 0.078
***
 
 (7.10) (4.40) (3.25) (8.25) 
SMALLt 0.015
**
 0.020
**
 0.029
***
 0.014
*
 
 (2.31) (2.37) (4.39) (1.85) 
MVEt-1 -0.004
**
 -0.005
***
 -0.004
***
 -0.004
**
 
 (-2.29) (-3.60) (-3.25) (-2.16) 
ROAt  -0.012
***
 -0.097
***
 -0.088
***
 -0.015
***
 
 (-2.76) (-8.40) (-8.63) (-3.31) 
MTBt-1  0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.17) (0.53) (-0.20) (-0.79) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
N 1,563 1,563 1,354 1,354 
Adj. R
2
 0.276 0.257 0.137 0.159 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels (two-sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm.  
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year 
performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t-1. 
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Auditor Competition and Clientele Effect  
The GAO’s (2008) report indicates that the small public company audit market is much less 
concentrated than for larger companies. Especially, the auditor choices of most large public 
companies are limited to three or four audit firms. In other words, small public companies have 
more choices regarding the selection of their auditors, while large public companies have limited 
auditor selection choices. This suggests that the audit market for small public company may be 
more competitive, when compared with the audit market for large public firms.  
I examine this issue by partitioning my propensity score matched sample into small 
public clients and large public clients for each industry-year grouping. For firm-year 
observations with less sales revenue than the median sales revenue in one industry-year group, 
they are classified as small clients. The result is reported in Table 8. In the first column of Table 
8, the result shows that the association between ABSDA (ABSPDA) and SMALL is significantly 
positive (p-value <0.01), which means that small audit firms are associated with a higher level of 
accruals management of their clients when their clients are small public clients.  This suggests 
that auditor competition is higher in the small public clients audit market, which leads to the 
lower ability of small audit firms to constrain accruals management behavior by their clients. 
The second column of Table 8 presents the result for large public clients of my 
propensity score matched sample. The coefficient on SMALL is still significantly positive when 
the dependent variable is ABSDA (p-value <0.05); yet it is not significant when the dependent  
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TABLE 8  
Audit Market for Small Public Clients and Large Public Clients 
Client Size Small Public Clients Large Public Clients 
 ABSDAt ABSPDAt ABSDAt ABSPDAt 
Intercept 0.085
***
 0.091
***
 0.068
***
 0.070
***
 
 (4.16) (4.42) (5.22) (3.46) 
SMALLt 0.034
***
 0.030
***
 0.019
**
 0.014 
 (4.75) (3.34) (2.53) (1.51) 
MVEt-1 -0.013
***
 -0.015
***
 -0.003
***
 -0.003
***
 
 (-3.64) (-3.98) (-2.75) (-2.66) 
ROAt  -0.015
*
 -0.018
**
 -0.051
***
 -0.064
***
 
 (-1.95) (-2.27) (-3.90) (-3.97) 
MTBt-1  -0.001 -0.001 0.002
***
 0.001 
 (-0.99) (-0.83) (3.66) (1.64) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included 
N 1,475 1,475 1,442 1,442 
Adj. R
2
 0.149 0.153 0.099 0.108 
Client size is based on sales revenue of the client. The full sample is the Propensity-Score 
Matched Sample defined in Table 1. MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying 
observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels (two-
sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in parentheses are based on robust standard errors 
clustered by firm.  
 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients and 
zero otherwise; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t-1. 
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variable is ABSPDA. This implies that the positive association between accruals management 
and the use of small audit firms still holds for large clients to some extent, although it is not as 
significant as in the small client audit market. 
 
4.4 Size of small audit firms 
Definition of small audit firms: Different Thresholds 
To ensure these results are not affected by the definition of smaller audit firms, I use different 
thresholds to define smaller audit firms: that is, audit firms with fewer than 30 clients or 50 
clients. I first identify these audit firms and then perform the propensity-score matching 
procedure to collect their respective control firms. The result is reported in Table 9. In Panel A, 
the coefficients for SMALL for both absolute abnormal accruals and absolute performance-
adjusted accruals are significantly positive, which suggests that the positive association between 
accruals management and using smaller audit firms holds for audit firms with fewer than 30 
clients. When I split the sample into positive accruals and negative accruals, only the coefficient 
of SMALL for negative performance-adjusted accruals is insignificant (SMALL remains 
significant for positive and negative abnormal accruals and for positive performance-adjusted 
accruals). In Panel B, the coefficients for SMALL for absolute accruals, using either the modified 
Jones model abnormal accruals or performance-adjusted abnormal accruals, are all significantly 
positive. This shows that clients of smaller audit firms with fewer than 50 clients engage in a  
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TABLE 9 
Different Thresholds of Small Audit Firms 
Panel A: Small = audit firms with fewer than 30 clients 
 ABSDAt PosDAt NegDAt ABSPDAt PosPDAt NegPDAt 
Intercept 0.069
***
 0.068
***
 −0.071
***
 0.074
***
 0.052
***
 −0.097
***
 
 (6.30) (5.67) (−4.31) (7.15) (3.87) (−3.57) 
SMALLt 0.023
***
 0.024
***
 −0.017
**
 0.016
**
 0.017
**
 −0.009 
 (4.23) (3.17) (−2.28) (2.27) (2.18) (−1.01) 
MVEt-1 −0.002
**
 −0.003
**
 0.002 −0.002
**
 −0.003
**
 0.001 
 (−2.50) (−2.03) (1.33) (−2.43) (−2.21) (0.98) 
ROAt  −0.082
***
 −0.012 0.109
***
 −0.092
***
 −0.034
**
 0.120
***
 
 (−5.09) (−0.77) (4.24) (−5.68) (−2.23) (4.97) 
MTBt-1  −0.000 0.001
**
 0.002 −0.001 0.000 0.002 
 (−0.18) (2.39) (1.44) (−1.21) (0.21) (1.34) 
Year fixed 
effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry 
fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2,048 1,052 996 2,048 1,051 997 
Adj. R
2
 0.201 0.080 0.321 0.206 0.089 0.326 
Panel B: Small = audit firms with fewer than 50 clients 
 ABSDAt PosDAt NegDAt ABSPDAt PosPDAt NegPDAt 
Intercept 0.071
***
 0.062
***
 −0.075
***
 0.068
***
 0.065
***
 −0.068
***
 
 (5.33) (21.41) (−2.61) (5.17) (9.43) (−3.45) 
SMALLt 0.032
***
 0.029
***
 −0.033
***
 0.029
***
 0.025
***
 −0.031
***
 
 (4.29) (3.21) (−3.56) (3.04) (2.67) (−2.88) 
MVEt-1 −0.004
***
 −0.004
**
 0.005
***
 −0.004
***
 −0.004
**
 0.004
***
 
 (−3.63) (−2.45) (3.75) (−3.14) (−2.13) (2.87) 
ROAt  −0.072
***
 0.014 0.089
***
 −0.082
***
 0.005 0.105
***
 
 (−4.83) (0.83) (5.75) (−4.90) (0.36) (5.85) 
MTBt-1  −0.001
**
 −0.001
**
 0.002 −0.002
***
 −0.003
***
 0.001 
 (−2.04) (−2.24) (1.35) (−2.59) (−4.64) (0.73) 
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Year fixed 
effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry 
fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2,800 1,399 1,401 2,800 1,415 1,385 
Adj. R
2
 0.229 0.076 0.355 0.232 0.067 0.390 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentiles of their distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively. 
Reported t-statistics in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
PosDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
NegDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
PosPDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
NegPDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year 
performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year t;  
 
 
higher level of earnings management than the control group. In addition, the results are not 
sensitive to the direction of accruals management when I decompose the sample into income-
increasing and income-decreasing accruals. Specifically, the coefficients for SMALL are 
significant in the expected direction in both cases. 
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Number of Clients 
Prior studies indicates that Non-Big N auditors have more experience when they have a 
larger client base (Krishnan & Schauer 2000; Albring, Elder, and Zhou 2007).
10
  Therefore, I 
examine whether the size of the client base would mitigate the positive association with earnings 
management and the use of small audit firms. Specifically, I test whether a negative association 
can be found between the size of audit firms client base (AUDSIZE, the number of clients an 
auditor has) and accruals management for a sample of small audit firms. I use both the full 
sample and the propensity-score matched sample to examine this issue. The result is reported in 
Table 10. 
As reported in Table 10, the coefficient on AUDSIZE is significantly negative when the 
dependent variable is either performance adjusted discretionary accruals or modified Jones 
discretionary accruals using the full sample. When I use the propensity-score matched sample to 
examine the relationship, the result is qualitatively the same. This suggests that small audit firms 
gain more experience when they have a larger client base and this may enhance their ability to 
constrain accruals management behavior. These results are also consistent with small audit firms 
(as defined previously) being associated with earnings management. 
                                                 
10
 It is not possible to measure the specialists for small audit firms in the traditional way since they usually have 
relatively small market share in an industry. 
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TABLE 10  
Sensitivity based on Audit Firm Size  
 Full Sample  
(Small=1) 
Propensity Score Matched 
Sample (Small=1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ABSDAt ABSPDAt ABSDAt ABSPDAt 
Intercept 0.111
***
 0.113
***
 0.093
***
 0.096
***
 
 (5.88) (6.82) (5.27) (6.05) 
AUDSIZEt -0.001
**
 -0.001
*
 -0.001
**
 -0.001
*
 
 (-2.03) (-1.71) (-2.05) (-1.78) 
MVEt-1 -0.023
***
 -0.027
***
 -0.012
***
 -0.013
***
 
 (-6.40) (-6.25) (-4.55) (-4.70) 
ROAt  -0.010
**
 -0.012
**
 -0.014
**
 -0.016
**
 
 (-2.19) (-2.29) (-2.14) (-2.46) 
MTBt-1  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (-1.13) (-1.15) (1.02) (1.10) 
Year Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
Industry Fixed Effect Included Included Included Included 
     
N 4,413 4,413 1,466 1,466 
Adj. R
2
 0.121 0.121 0.155 0.161 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in 
the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All firm-year observations 
are clients of small audit firms. 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
AUDSIZEt = the number of clients of an audit firm; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t;  
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4.5 Exiting Auditors  
DeFond and Lennox (2011) document that compared to non-exiting auditors, auditors who 
exited the market following SOX are lower quality auditors. To examine whether these results 
are driven by exiting small auditors, I exclude all exiting auditors and re-run the tests. I define 
exiting small auditors as those who were not registered with PCAOB in 2010 and I use the 
PCAOB’s list of audit firm name changes as a supplement in case that an audit firm is classified 
as an exiting auditor if it has changed its name only. In the final sample of small audit firms 
(1,524 firm-year observations), there are 254 small audit firms (1,158 firm-year observations) 
and 92 of them are exiting auditors as defined above (366 firm-year observations). I examine the 
relation between the use of small audit firms and earnings management after including a dummy 
variable for these 92 exiting audit firms and report the result in Table 11. 
In Table 11, the coefficients on SMALL are all significantly different from zero across the 
different earnings management measures (absolute or raw values of accruals and real earnings 
management measure), which suggests that firms using the small audit firms engage in a higher 
level of accruals or real earnings management. The coefficients on the dummy variable for 
exiting auditors are not significant. In addition, the significance of the coefficients on the control  
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TABLE 11 
The Association between Small Audit Firms and Earnings Management: Controlling for Exiting Auditors 
 ABSDAt PosDAt NegDAt ABSPDAt PosPDAt NegPDAt RM 
Intercept 0.079
***
 0.092
***
 −0.071
***
 0.084
***
 0.116
***
 −0.053
***
 0.262
**
 
 (6.40) (3.84) (−3.38) (7.57) (3.48) (−2.84) (2.08) 
SMALLt 0.021
***
 0.020
**
 −0.018
***
 0.017
***
 0.015
*
 −0.018
**
 0.192
*
 
 (4.52) (2.30) (−2.74) (2.69) (1.93) (−2.08) (1.78) 
EXITAUDt 0.018 −0.006 −0.032 0.011 −0.012 −0.030 -0.161 
 (1.12) (−0.42) (−1.61) (0.50) (−0.98) (−0.89) (-1.15) 
MVEt-1 −0.004
***
 −0.003
***
 0.009
***
 −0.005
***
 −0.007
***
 0.005
**
 -0.050
***
 
 (−3.04) (−2.74) (5.82) (−2.82) (−4.87) (2.20) (-3.84) 
ROAt  −0.017
*
 0.053 0.016
*
 −0.020
**
 0.035 0.020
**
 -0.066
**
 
 (−1.87) (0.97) (1.79) (−2.14) (0.62) (2.01) (-2.02) 
MTBt-1  −0.000 0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 -0.007 
 (−0.36) (0.08) (0.47) (−0.46) (−0.35) (−0.20) (-0.58) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 2,917 1,503 1,414 2,917 1,484 1,433 2,850 
Adj. R
2
 0.114 0.075 0.158 0.118 0.056 0.168 0.068 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles of their distributions to 
mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-
sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
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Variable Definitions: 
ABSDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
Pos_DAt = positive values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
Neg_DAt = negative values of discretionary accruals estimated from equation (2); 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
PosPDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
NegPDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
EXITAUDt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm’s name does not appear on 
the PCAOB’s list of registered audit firms in 2010; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of year t;  
ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio at the beginning of year t. 
 
variables is consistent with that observed in prior tests. All in all, the result shows that the 
conclusion of a higher level of earnings management with the use of small audit firms is not 
sensitive to firms that exited the market following SOX. 
 
4.6 Different Audit Quality Measure 
In this section, I use different measure of audit quality to examine the relationship between 
audit quality and the use of small audit firms – the accruals quality measure developed by 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) as implemented by Francis et al. (2005). Specifically, I calculate the 
accruals quality measure using the following equation for each of Fama and French’s (1997) 48 
industry groups (for ease of exposition, firm subscripts are suppressed): 
TCAt = β0 + β1 CFOt-1 + β2 CFOt + β3 CFOt+1 + β4 ΔREVt + β5 PPEt + ut,     (7) 
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where TCAt is a firm’s total accruals in year t, CFOt is a firm’s cash flow from operations in 
year t, ΔREVt is a firm’s total accruals in year t, and PPEt is a firm’s gross value of property, 
plant, and equipment in year t. Total accruals is calculated as TCAt = ΔCAt − ΔCLt − ΔCasht + 
ΔSTDEBTt – DEPNt. ΔCAt is a firm’s change in current assets between year t−1 and year t, 
ΔCLt is a firm’s change in current liabilities between year t−1 and year t, ΔCasht is a firm’s 
change in current liabilities between year t−1 and year t, ΔSTDEBTt is a firm’s change in debt in 
current liabilities between year t−1 and year t, and DEPNt is a firm’s depreciation and 
amortization expense in year t. CFOt is defined as the difference between a firm’s net income 
before extraordinary items and total accruals (TCA) in year t. Finally, accruals quality AQt = 
σ(ut), which is equal to the standard deviation of a firm’s residuals ut from equation (7). A higher 
AQt  (larger standard deviations of residuals) represents poorer accruals quality. 
Similar to Francis et al (2005), I use the following variables as control variables: (1) size, 
measured as log of total assets (denote as Size); (2) cash flow volatility, calculated as the 
standard deviation of a firms cash flows over the past 10 years (denote as CVOL); (3) sales 
volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of a firms sales revenue over the past 10 years 
(denote as SVOL); (4) operating cycle, calculated as log of the sum of days accounts receivable 
and days inventory (denote as LogOC); and (5) negative earnings, which is a dummy variable 
equal to one if income before extraordinary items is negative (denote as NegEarn). The results 
are reported in Table 12.  
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TABLE 12 
The Association between Accrual Quality and Small Audit Firms  
AQt Including exiting auditors Excluding exiting auditors 
Intercept 0.054*** 0.045*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 
 (7.67) (3.55) (7.82) (4.66) 
SMALLt 0.011*** 0.006* 0.010
*** 0.005 
 (3.46) (1.77) (2.92) (1.56) 
SIZEt  -0.008***  -0.009*** 
  (-5.44)  (-5.47) 
CVOLt   0.115***  0.118*** 
  (5.56)  (5.23) 
SVOLt   0.036***  0.036*** 
  (4.02)  (3.90) 
LogOCt   0.000  0.000 
  (0.16)  (0.03) 
NEGEARNt   0.019***  0.013* 
  (2.77)  (1.84) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included 
N 2,201 1,690 2,031 1,564 
Pseudo R
2 0.115 0.319 0.117 0.319 
The table presents the results of a probit regression of the determinants of small auditor choice 
based on the pooled sample from 2001-2009. SIZE, CVOL, SVOL, LogOC, and NEGEARN are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying 
observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
sided), respectively.  The z-values are shown in parentheses. 
 
Variable definitions: 
AQt = standard deviation of firm j’s residuals, from years t–4 to t from annual 
cross-sectional estimations of the Francis et al. (2005) model; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients 
and zero otherwise; 
SIZEt = log of assets at the end of the year t; 
CVOLt = the standard deviation of a firms cash flows over the past 10 years in year t; 
SVOLt = calculated as the standard deviation of a firms sales revenue over the past 10 
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years in year t; 
LogOCt = log of the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory, which is 
equal to (360/(Sales/Average AR) + 360/(Cost of Goods Sold)/(Average 
Inventory)); and 
NEGEARNt = a dummy variable equal to one if income before extraordinary items is less 
than zero. 
 
 
I report the result when including exiting auditors and excluding them separately. I found a 
significantly positive coefficient on SMALL when I include exiting auditors, either with or 
without control variables, which suggests that the use of small audit firms is associated with a 
higher level of AQ (poor accruals quality). When I exclude exiting auditors, I find a significantly 
positive coefficient on SMALL without adding control variables (p-value < 1%). Although the 
coefficient on SMALL is not significant based on a two-tailed test when adding control variables, 
it is significantly positive based on a one-tailed test (p-value = 0.059). Overall, I find some 
evidence that that the use of small audit firms is associated with a higher level of AQ (poor 
accruals quality). 
 
4.7 Different Matching Procedure 
Lawrence et al. (2011) find that the audit quality supplied by Big 4 auditors is not 
significantly different from that of non-Big 4 auditors when they use a propensity score matched 
sample to control for client characteristics. They treat non-Big 4 auditors as a homogenous group. 
Instead, this study treats non-Big 4 auditors as a heterogeneous group and shows that small audit 
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firms provide lower audit quality than Big 4 auditors. To reconcile my results with Lawrence et 
al. (2011), I use an approach similar to Lawrence et al.’s (2011) procedure to select a propensity 
score matched sample (Lawrence et al. (2011) matched clients that chose Big 4 auditors, the 
earlier results in this study are based on a match of clients that use small audit firms). 
Specifically, I use the following Big 4 auditor choice model to estimate propensity scores and 
identify a matched sample for Big 4 audit firms: 
Big4t = β0 + β1 SIZEt + β2 LEVt + β3 ROAt + β4 ATURNt + β5 CURRt + β6 QUICKt 
   + β7 RISKINDt + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect + ut,                                  (8) 
where Big4 is a variable equal to one if the firm’s auditor is a Big 4 auditor and zero 
otherwise; all other variables are defined in equation (1). I identify 1,254 firm-year observations 
with the Big 4 auditors and 1,254 firm-year observations with non-Big 4 auditors using this 
procedure. Of the 1,254 firm-year observations with non-Big 4 auditors, 744 observations use 
small audit firms and 544 observations use other non-Big 4 auditors (mid-tier auditors). I use 
absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals as dependent variable and report 
the result in Table 13. 
In column (1) of Table 13, I compare Big 4 auditors with non-Big 4 auditors to see if the 
finding in my sample is consistent with Lawrence et al. (2011)’s finding. I find that the 
coefficient on the Big 4 dummy variable is insignificantly different from zero, which is 
consistent with Lawrence et al.’s (2011) finding. I then decompose non-Big 4 auditors into mid- 
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TABLE 13  
Different Matching Procedures: Propensity-Score Matched Sample 
Dependent Variable: ABSPDAt 
 (1)  
Big4 vs. Non-Big4 
(2)  
Big4 vs. Mid-Tier 
(3)  
Big4 vs. Small 
Intercept 0.088
***
 0.078
***
 0.095
***
 
 (4.98) (4.31) (5.26) 
Big4t -0.015 0.011 -0.031
**
 
 (-1.36) (0.86) (-2.42) 
MVEt-1 -0.010
***
 -0.005
**
 -0.012
***
 
 (-4.07) (-2.36) (-3.94) 
ROAt  -0.083
***
 -0.137
***
 -0.079
***
 
 (-7.20) (-6.60) (-7.24) 
MTBt-1  0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.80) (0.93) (0.26) 
Year fixed effect Included Included Included 
Industry fixed effect Included Included Included 
N 2,392 1,676 1,903 
Adj. R
2
 0.224 0.275 0.228 
The sample size is 1,254 firm-year observations with Big 4 auditors and 1,254 firm-year 
observations with non-Big 4 auditors before adding control variables. Of the 1,254 firm-year 
observations with non-Big 4 auditors, 744 observations are with small audit firms and 544 
observations are with other non-Big 4 auditors (mid-tier auditors). Including control variables in 
the regression model causes the sample size for each column drop a bit.  
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in 
the parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. 
Variable Definitions: 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
Big4t = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm is a Big4 auditor and zero 
otherwise; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
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ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t;  
 
 
  
 
 
tier audit firms and small audit firms and report the results in column (2) and column (3) 
respectively. In column (2) of Table 13, the coefficient on Big4 is insignificantly different from 
zero, which suggests that there is no difference in absolute values of discretionary accruals 
between Big 4 auditors and mid-tier auditors. However, column (3) of Table 13 shows that the 
coefficient on Big4 is significantly negative (−0.031, p-value < 0.05), which means that Big 4 
auditors have higher ability to constrain managers’ earnings management behavior proxied by 
absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals. This implies that the difference 
in accruals earnings management between Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors is driven by 
small audit firms.  
 
4.8 Economic Dependence 
DeAngelo (1981) indicates that an auditor’s incentive to compromise his independence with 
respect to a client depends on the relative economic importance of a client in the auditor’s client 
portfolio. The economic importance is measured by the ratio of quasi rents specific to that client 
divided by the sum of all other quasi rents. In this section I examine whether the economic 
dependence of the auditors on their clients would have an impact on the relationship between the 
use of small audit firms and earnings management. If the economic importance of one client 
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affects the auditor’s incentives to compromise his independence, we may observe a higher level 
of earnings management when the client is economically important in the auditor’s portfolio. 
Since the quasi rents ratio is unobservable empirically, prior literature uses the ratio of fees 
from a client divided by the audit firm's total revenues (Lys and Watts 1994; Chung and Kallapur 
2003). Thus I use this ratio and the following model to test whether the relationship between the 
use of small audit firms and earnings management is affected by client importance:  
ABSPDAt  (PosPDA, NegPDA)= γ0 + γ1 SMALLt + γ2 IMP + γ3 SMALL*IMP+ γ4 MVEt-1 
+ γ5 ROAt + γ6 MTBt-1 + Year Fixed Effect + Industry Fixed Effect + vt,          (9) 
where IMP is the ratio of client fees (audit fees and non-audit fees) to the total U.S. revenues of 
the audit firm, and all other variables were defined previously. The coefficient of interest is γ3 
because it shows how client importance would affect the association between earnings 
management and the use of small audit firms. 
The result is reported in Table 14. Although the coefficients on SMALL are all significantly 
positive, the coefficients on the interaction term of SMALL and IMP are all insignificantly 
different from zero, either when I use signed abnormal accruals or unsigned abnormal accruals. 
Consequently, client importance does not have impact on the level of earnings management for 
clients of small audit firms. This is consistent with Chung and Kallapur’s (2003) finding that 
client importance is not significantly associated with auditor’s ability to constrain earnings 
management behavior.    
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TABLE 14 
Economic Dependence of Auditors on Their Clients 
 ABSPDAt PosPDAt NegPDAt 
Intercept 0.076*** 0.123*** -0.027** 
 (3.90) (3.17) (-2.18) 
SMALLt 0.025
*** 0.018** -0.020** 
 (4.39) (2.15) (-2.39) 
IMPt 1.643 -1.481 -3.416 
 (0.69) (-0.48) (-1.36) 
SMALLt*IMPt -1.678 1.452 3.460 
 (-0.71) (0.47) (1.38) 
MVEt-1 -0.003
*** -0.006*** 0.002** 
 (-2.61) (-4.15) (2.23) 
ROAt  -0.104
*** 0.029 0.121*** 
 (-9.39) (0.48) (6.75) 
MTBt-1  0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.26) (-0.46) (-1.14) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included 
N 2,609 1,346 1,263 
Pseudo R
2 0.259 0.051 0.427 
MVE, ROA, MTB, and all dependent variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of their 
distributions to mitigate the influence of outlying observations. 
*
, 
**
 and 
***
 indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels (two-sided), respectively. Reported t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. Exiting auditors are excluded 
from the sample and analysis. 
Variable definitions: 
ABSPDAt = absolute values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
PosPDAt = positive values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
NegPDAt = negative values of discretionary accruals adjusted for prior year performance; 
SMALLt = a dummy variable equal to one if the audit firm has fewer than 100 clients and 
zero otherwise; 
IMPt = the ratio of client fees (audit fees and non-audit fees) to the total U.S. revenues 
of the audit firm; 
MVEt-1 = the market value of equity at the beginning of the year t;  
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ROAt = income before extraordinary items divided by beginning-of-year assets; and 
MTBt-1 = market-to-book ratio in year t-1. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
Smaller audit firms have attracted limited attention both in practice and in academic research 
since PCAOB inspections were implemented. This paper investigates the role of small audit 
firms on earnings management. Specifically, this paper examines what types of clients choose 
small audit firms, and whether small audit firms have less ability to constrain managers’ 
opportunistic behavior. I find that the choice of small audit firms is associated with a higher level 
of earnings manipulation, when measured by accruals management. However, I find no evidence 
that the use of small audit firms is associated with a higher level of real activities manipulations. 
DeAngelo (1981) argues that larger audit firms have “more to lose” if they fail to report a 
breach. Since DeAngelo (1981) provides theoretical support for audit firm size as a proxy for 
auditor quality, a large body of research uses larger audit firm size as a surrogate for better audit 
quality (e.g., Teoh and Wong 1993, Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Francis and Krishnan 
1999; Weber and Willenborg 2003; Lennox and Pittman 2010). Nonetheless, some recent studies 
show that there is no actual difference in audit quality between Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 
auditors. Specifically, Lawrence et al. (2011) show that the differences in proxies for audit 
quality between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are more likely attributable to client characteristics. 
Further, Boone et al. (2010) show that little evidence exists of a difference in audit quality 
between Big 4 and second-tier audit firms (using abnormal accruals as a proxy for audit quality). 
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By investigating a specific group of auditors that are small audit firms, this study extends our 
understanding of the role of audit firm size in audit quality. I acknowledge that the conclusions 
may be sensitive to different measures of earnings management. Moreover, I do not know 
whether this phenomenon is driven by auditor independence issues or a lack of expertise among 
small audit firms. In addition, I do not know whether the pairing of auditors and clients is 
initiated by auditors or their clients. Prior auditor change research has been unable to examine 
auditor resignation and client dismissal separately and, therefore, has focused on the issue as a 
joint decision (e.g., Nichols and Smith 1983; Francis and Wilson 1988; Shu 2000). Nevertheless, 
the use of small audit firms deserves more attention given the changes currently reshaping the 
auditing profession.  
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